This paper examines the impact of industrial productivity on transnationals M&As from OECD countries towards Latin American countries in the period 1996 to 2010. It also analyzes the relationship between external mechanism of corporate governance and 2 transnational M&As. For this purpose we use a gravitational model at the industry level. We find that industry productivity and higher standards of corporate governance in the country of origin promote transnational M&As activity. However, it is also found that higher levels of capital and technological productivity decreases transnational M&As activity.
transnational M&As as a particular case of foreign direct investment (FDI). Considering transnational M&As as a particular case of FDI has important consequences, given that they are starting to gain more weight on international investment flows, representing up to 80% of total FDI (Hyun and Kim 2010). As such, these transactions have macroeconomic determinants that make them different from domestic M&As and, therefore, they must be studied independently.
The pioneers in applying a gravitational model to analyze transnational M&As were Di Giovanni (2005) and Portes and Rey (2005) . Later, Hyun and Kim (2010) revisited the gravitational model to conclude that institutional quality of the country promotes transnational M&As activity. The usage of the gravitational model to study transnational M&As, which was motivated as a consequence of analyzing this phenomenon as a particular case of FDI, has been given theoretical support by Head and Ries (2008) and Hijzen, Gorg and Manchin (2008) .
In this sense, this paper aims at verifying whether higher levels of industry productivity leads to a higher transnational M&As activity, directed from the OECD countries towards Latin America. Additionally, whether this activity is stimulated by the external mechanism of corporate governance of both countries. For this purpose, we employ a gravitational model at the industry level.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold: the approach regarding productivity and the usage of the gravitational model at the industry level. Modeling at the industry level can bring about additional inferences on the topic and can potentially open doors for future studies that include more determinants of this phenomenon. Other studies (eg. Andrade and Stafford 2004; Harford 2005; Mitchell and Mulherin 1996) , propose and verify the relation between industry shocks and M&As activity. However, none of these studies consider different measures of productivity and their relation with M&As as a particular case of FDI.
Furthermore, the authors that have applied the gravitational model to transnationals M&As, have always done so at the country level (Di Giovanni 2005; Erel, Liao, and Weisbach 2012; Head and Ries 2008; Hyun and Kim 2010; Portes and Rey 2005) .
1 Finally, we measure industry productivity for each factor of production. That is, we identify the impact of labor, capital, and technological productivity on transnationals M&As.
The rest of the paper is structured as follow. Next section present the background and justifies the hypothesis tested. Methodology section describes the model, the data and the variables.
Followed by the results and finally the conclusions of the study.
Background and Hypothesis

Industry Determinants
Until now, all studies that have applied the gravitational model to transnational M&As have specified the model at the country level. 2 However, in the international trade literature, where the model has been extensively developed, it is possible to find applications of different specifications of the gravitational equation at the industry level (Bergstrand 1989; Brainard 1993) . In the present study the relationship between industry productivity and transnational
M&As activity through a gravitational model is established.
There is evidence in the literature that indicates that higher industry productivity leads to higher levels of transnational M&As activity. According to Helpman, Melitz and Yealpe (2004) , only the most productive firms are involved in international activities, and the more productive they are, the higher their preference towards FDI instead of exporting. This theoretical framework is also applied and verified by Damijan, Polanec and Prašnikar (2007) , who found that greater capital intensity leads to higher propensity to invest abroad. Although the previous studies are at the firm level, Pantelidis and Kyrikilis (2005) evaluate the factors that determine FDI in an economy. They found as the causes for investment activity: capital abundance (and therefore a lower marginal productivity of capital), differences among demand structures, competitive advantage (or technological productivity), human capital, currency appreciation, and the openness degree of the economy.
Even though the previous studies establish the relation between industry productivity and FDI, the different approaches could be particularly applied to transnational M&As. As mentioned before, transnational M&As are one of the channels available of FDI, which is also becoming one of the most important. Additionally, it is well known that M&As are a mechanism to enter other markets, which is consistent with the hypothesis of Helpman, Melitz and Yealpe. (2004) .
Based on the literature we proposed the following hypothesis about the relation between industry productivity and transnational M&As.
Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of industry productivity leads to higher transnational M&As activity from OECD countries to Lantin American countries.
Corporate governance
Within the theoretical framework of Corporate Governance, the topic related to the market of corporate control has been one of the most widely discussed (Tirole 2005) . Authors such as Jensen (1984; 1988; 1989a; 1989b) , Jensen and Ruback (1983) , among others, argue that the weakness in the corporate governance system in the 80s in the United States, is one of the possible causes for the growth of M&As.
According to Denis and McConnel (2003) A particular study that is in line with our research is Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2012) , who employed a gravitational model at the country level and found that the geographical distance, the quality of accounting information, and the level of bilateral trade are among some of the determinants of M&As activity between two countries. Additionally, the authors argue that it is likely that institutional characteristics at the country level are positively correlated with better corporate governance. However, they do not consider industry productivity as a determinant of M&As among countries.
This leads to the following hypothesis about the relation between M&As and corporate governance.
Hypothesis 2: External mechanisms of corporate governance propitiate M&As activity from OECD countries to Latin American countries.
Methodology
The model
The gravitational model was initially proposed as an empirical approach for the study of bilateral trade (Linnemann 1966; Tinbergen 2007) . It was based on Newton's gravity law, according to which the force of attraction between two bodies (in this case between international flows) is directly proportional to their masses (size of the economies) and inversely proportional to the distance between them (geographical separation or cultural distances), as it is described in equation 1. The log-log specification of this expression has boosted the empirical research on international commerce through econometric models. 
Later on, the model was given theoretical support by Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985) , which allowed for the development of other specifications and the application of the model to different areas of study. The model has been applied, for example, to intra-industry trade (Bergstrand 1989; Bergstrand 1990) , to explain the relation between unilateral and bilateral trade flows at the industry level (Brainard 1993) , and to explore different measures of cultural distance (Tadesse and White 2008) and of common language (Melitz 2008 [ Table 1 about here]
The composition by country, as shown in Table 2 , is highly concentrated in the country of origin, and no so much in the destination country. Around 80% of the total of announcements comes from five countries: United States, Canada, Spain, France, and England. The concentration of horizontal M&As announcements is also high, although Canada represents the majority of announcements. This is because most of the announcements that come from Canadian companies in the mining industry are of horizontal type. [ Table 2 about here]
The data for the GDP at the country level is taken from the World Bank's World Different measures are employed for capital productivity (PK). One of the measures is the real interest rate, under the assumption that producers maximize their profits when the marginal productivity of capital is equal to its cost, that is, the real interest rate. According to this, we use the interest rate on loans in the country of origin, obtained from the World Development
Indicators database, and subtracting from it the implicit inflation in the industry deflator.
Other calculated measures employed in this study are industry's production and value added over its stock of capital. Similar to capital productivity, different measures are used for labor productivity. Under the same profit maximization assumption, in which the marginal productivity of labor is equal to its cost, that is wages, we calculate the wage for the industry by dividing the labor cost over the number of employees. It is also calculated the value added of the industry divided by labor costs, the number of employees, and the working hours.
Similarly, different measures of technological productivity are employed at the country and industry levels. At the country level, we calculate the number of patent requests divided by:
the number of people dedicated to research and development, number of people with tertiary education, total population, and total production. The number of patents for the country and the data on population are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators database. At the industry level, we calculate the expenditure on research and development over total production and over the stock of capital. Research and development expenditures are taken from the STAN R&D Expenditure in Industry database of the OECD.
The corporate governance variables are at the macro level given that the gravitational model, by definition, has an aggregated specification. According to the literature presented in the background section, these measures correspond to external mechanisms of corporate governance. There exist empirical findings that suggest that in less developed countries the greatest proportion in the variation of individual standards of corporate governance are explained by own country characteristics and not by firm characteristics (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2007) . For this reason, we employ the Kaufmann variables, which are at the country level, time varying and constructed from a model of unobservable components with perceptual information from different sources on governance and institutionality (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010). The institutional environment that captures these variables, according to Daniel, Cieslewicz, and Pourjalali (2011) , determines the practices of corporate governance.
We also take two of the La Porta's indicators. The first one is the anti-director rights, which is a measure of protection for the minority shareholders based on legal mechanisms and it is related to voting rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1998). The second one is the anti-self-dealing index, which measures the level of stockholders protection against tunneling transactions (Djankov et al. 2008) .
Given [ Figure 1 about here] The variable Open measures the level of economic openness of the industry. It is calculated as the sum of industry exports and imports, divided by its total production (Chuang and Lin 1999 It is expected that the presence of a trade agreement discourages transnational M&As activity, that is, that its sign is negative, contrary to international trade models. This is because the takeover market is a substitute of international trade. On the other hand, the effect of the earnings corporate tax rate is not completely clear. Some countries, in particular the emerging ones, have adopted tax relief policies in order to attract FDI (Hines Jr. 2001) , and so it could be expected that higher tax rates discourage transnational M&As activity. However, it is documented that many times the empirical findings are contradictory (Hines Jr. 1997) . With respect to corporate governance variables, it is expected that they have a positive sign, as it is argued in our hypothesis. In order to verify this result, additional robustness tests are performed.
In line with the hypothesis of this study, it is also expected that the sign of the different productivity measures is positive. This is the case, for example, for the labor and technological productivity. However, in the case of capital productivity, the neoclassical theory proposes that investment is encouraged under the presence of high marginal productivity of capital, which occurs when the interest rate is high and there is low intensity in the usage of capital. Therefore, in line with this observation and the findings in studies related to FDI (Damijan et al. 2007; Helpman et al. 2004 ) we expect to find that in industries with high capital abundance, low marginal productivity of capital and low interest rates, there is more propensity to invest in foreign countries in the form of transnational M&As, and so we expect the sign of this variable to be negative.
Finally, it is expected that the sign of the openness variable is negative, for the same reason of the trade agreements variable: the lack of trade openness is an a priori barrier for the development of international trade, and so it is substituted by the takeover market. The difference between the two variables is that bilateral agreements reflect only the subscription of a treaty, while trade openness reflects how much the different agents in the economy take advantage of such agreements. And regarding the trade level between the industry in the country of origin and the destination country, it is expected that it encourages M&As activity, after controlling for trade agreements and openness, given that if the bilateral relation is high, it is due to less frictions for business development among the two. On the other hand, although the variable for the corporate tax rate in the destination country (TaxR ) presents a positive sign, contrary to the expected, this is not at all surprising given similar findings in previous studies (Hines Jr. 1997) . Trade openness (Open ) has negative sign but it is only significant in one of the estimations; and bilateral trade (lnTrade ) is also significant with a positive sign, as expected.
Results
Main results
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 , the results of the negative binomial and Tobit estimations are presented, but considering as control variable the logarithm of industry's production in the country of origin (Prod GDP ) instead of total country's GDP. The results support the idea that the greater the size of the industry, the greater the transnational M&As activity. The signs and significance of the other variables do not present major differences, with the exception of technological productivity, openness, and bilateral trade, which lose statistical significance. Table 5 and 6 present the model estimations using alternative productivity variables through the negative binomial estimation methodology. 5 Columns 1 to 4 of Table 5 show the results of the additional variables for labor productivity: the logarithm of salary (Wage ), the logarithm of the industry value added over labor costs (ln(VA/Labor Costs) ), the logarithm of the industry value added over the number of employees (ln(VA/ Number of employees) ), and the logarithm of the industry value added over the number of working hours (ln(VA/Number of hours) ). The results are consistent with the previous ones, in the sense that labor productivity promotes transnational M&As activity. Additionally, the variables are statistically significant.
Robustness tests
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5 describe the results for the additional variables related to capital productivity: the logarithm of production over the industry's capital stock (ln(Prod/ Capital Stock) ), and the logarithm of the value added over the industry's capital stock (ln(VA/Capital Stock) ). However, the results are not statistically significant, although the same sign is preserved, just as for the variable real interest rate.
Columns 1 to 4 of Table 6 describe the results for the additional variables related to technological productivity: patents of the country of origin over population with tertiary education (Patents /Tertiary ed. people), industry's research and development expenditures over production (R&D expend. /Prod ), and the number of patents per capita of the country. The negative sign obtained before is persistent in these estimations as well. However, only patents over population with tertiary education and patents per capita turn out to be statistically significant.
Finally, columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 present an alternative measure for the corporate governance standards in the country of origin. Instead of using the latent variable (which is constructed with the Kaufmann and La Porta's indicators), we take the Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS) indicators for all companies that are traded in the stock market and that belong to the studied industries. 6 The average of the individual indicators is calculated at the industry and country levels.
7 Column 5 and 6 show the results for the variable at the country and industry level, respectively. The results confirm that the better the corporate governance standards in the country or industry of origin, the greater is the number of announcements of transnational M&As.
Conclusions
The present study examines the impact of industry productivity on transnational M&As activity from OECD countries to Latin American countries in the period 1996 to 2010. The results show that the gravitational model at the industry level is applicable to the analysis of transnational M&As. Just as it is predicted in the literature, we find a positive relation between the size of the origin and destination countries and the number of transnational M&A announcements.
Additionally, we find that the productivity variables of the destination country explain the level of transnational M&A activity. However, not all variables support the idea that the greater the productivity, the greater the number of M&As. In particular, the productivity of capital presents an inverse relation and it is highly significant, which could be justified by the fact that firms in countries with high capital abundance try to expand their activities abroad through the takeover international market. Finally, we find that the external mechanisms of corporate governance, for both the origin and destination countries, foster an institutional environment that propitiates the presence of transnational M&As.
Future research of M&A activity in Latin America may wish to focus on study the determinant of transnational M&As having into account the industry integration involved for example vertical, horizontal or diversification. Second the study of agency problems involved in the M&A deals using internal mechanisms of corporate governance.
Notes
1 The only exception, to our knowledge, is Hijzen, Görg and Manchin (2008) who specify a model at the industry level to contrast the hypothesis of tariff-jumping.
2 To our knowledge, the only theoretical and empirical model at the industry level has been developed by Hijzen, Görg and Manchin (2008) . 3 In this way, it is possible to obtain 33 industries from 32 destination countries to 6 countries of origin, during a period of 15 years, which allows to generate a total of 95,040 possible observations. However, most of the announcements are concentrated in a few countries of origin and their respective industries, because of which, out of the 95,040 observations, 93,155 take a value of zero. 4 For a formal definition of the construction of latent variables based on the analysis of principle components, see Lynn and McCulloch (2000) . 5 It is also estimated through Tobit, and the results are not qualitatively different.
6 A vast quantity of corporate governance studies has used these indicators, including studies on external mechanisms of corporate governance (Aggarwal et al. 2009; Bruno and Claessens 2010; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2007) . 7 An unpaired t test is performed for the median, and it shows that in a big part of the countries and industries there are statistically significant differences among each other. The table shows the transnational M&As announcements per industry of origin and year from the OECD countries to six Latin American countries, as reported by Thomson One, in the period 1996 and 2010. The following deals were excluded from the sample: a) Hostile takeovers, privatizations, leverage buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations, and repurchases. b) Industries with special regulations, such as: transportation and public services, finance, insurance and real state, individual sanitary services, education services, mutual organizations and public administration. c) Announcements in which less than 5% was being acquired. %  USA  206  401  95  60  352  58  1172 33%  92  135  41  34  155  23  480 30%  CAN  115  143  116  78  432  179  1063 30%  56  71  50  51  269  100  597 37%  ESP  70  59  30  16  50  9  234  7%  31  28  14  9  23  5  110  7%  FRA  54  114  16  14  20  0  218  6%  15  42  6  8  6  0  77  5%  GBR  41  67  14  12  34  16  184  5%  23  18  2  7  14  8  72  4%  AUS  8  47  37  5  10  18  125  3%  5  20  14  2  1  6  48  3%  NLD  22  32  12  8  19  4  97  3%  14  17  4  4  9  1  49  3%  DEU  15  51  6  0  22  1  95  3%  6  13  3  0  6  0  28  2%  ITA  13  38  2  2  3  0  58  2%  4 Total  592  1130  362  212  1001  295  3592 100% 263  428  148  124  509  145  1617 100%  %  16%  31%  10%  6%  28%  8%  100%  16%  26%  9%  8%  31% 9% 100%
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The table shows the transnational M&As announcements per country of origin and year from the OECD countries to six Latin American countries, as reported by Thomson One, in the period 1996 and 2010. The following deals were excluded from the sample: a) Hostile takeovers, privatizations, leverage buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations, and repurchases. b) Industries with special regulations, such as: transportation and public services, finance, insurance and real state, individual sanitary services, education services, mutual organizations and public administration. c) Announcements in which less than 5% was being acquired. (1) and (2), taking as dependent variables the transformation ( + ). The following announcements were excluded from the sample: a) Hostile takeovers, privatizations, leverage buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations, and repurchases. b) Industries with special regulations, such as: transportation and public services, finance, insurance and real state, individual sanitary services, education services, mutual organizations and public administration. c) Announcements in which less than 5% was being acquired. The variables definition is shown in Tables 3. The standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. ). The alternative variables are presented as follows: columns (1) to (4) contain the variables related to labor productivity, and columns (5) and (6) those related to capital productivity. The following announcements were excluded from the sample: a) Hostile takeovers, privatizations, leverage buyouts, spin-offs, Capital productivity Labor productivity recapitalizations, and repurchases. b) Industries with special regulations, such as: transportation and public services, finance, insurance and real state, individual sanitary services, education services, mutual organizations and public administration. c) Announcements in which less than 5% was being acquired. The variables definition is shown in Tables 3. The standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. (1) to (4) contain the variables related to technological productivity, and columns (5) and (6) those related to corporate governance standards. The following announcements were excluded from the sample: a) Hostile takeovers, privatizations, leverage buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations, and repurchases. b) Industries with special regulations, such as: transportation and public services, finance, insurance and real state, individual sanitary services, education services, mutual organizations and public administration. c) Announcements in which less than 5% was being acquired. The variables definition is shown in Tables 3. The standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
